Background and Aims Global payment and accountable care reform efforts in the United States may connect more in-
INTRODUCTION
While the global costs of substance use disorders (SUD) are high [1, 2] , treatment rates world-wide are low. Only one in six problem drug users world-wide, approximately 4.4 million people, are estimated to receive required drug treatment, and treatment rates vary substantially by region [3] . In the United States, fewer than 20% of individuals with drug use disorders and 10% with alcohol use disorders receive treatment [4] . SUD is often undetected in the United States and goes untreated in primary care settings and, similarly, medical care needs of individuals with SUD are not addressed properly in the specialty SUD treatment sector [5] . This is due in large part to the ongoing separation of the delivery and financing of SUD treatment from the rest of the medical system in the United States. It is also due to the fee-for-service payment system common in the United States, where a provider is reimbursed for each service delivered with no financial incentives to encourage coordinating care across multiple providers or choosing to provide only the highest-value services within a fixed budget [6] .
Private insurers and government insurance programs in the United States are beginning to experiment with new financing and delivery system models to encourage the provision of high-value services and emphasize care coordination and improved care integration. Instead of feefor-service payment, these payment delivery system reform models typically hold large provider organizations accountable for spending on all health-care services used by a defined population over a longer (e.g. 5 or 10 years) time horizon. So-called global payment, for example, involves a provider organization being allocated a fixed budget for all care delivered to its patients by a health insurance company. These models also generally place greater accountability on provider organizations for the quality of services provided through the use of financial incentives for meeting specified performance metrics [7] . This paper investigates the effects of the first model of global payment and accountable care implemented in the United States, the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC). The AQC was adopted by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts (BCBSMA) in 2009. The AQC pays large provider organizations a risk-adjusted global payment for all primary and specialty care provided to a defined population of patients over a 5-year period, with bonuses in the initial years of up to 10% of the global budget based on performance on a set of 64 quality metrics (Supporting information, Appendix S1). Research has shown that AQC implementation was associated with lower overall healthcare spending growth (driven primarily by a shift to lower-cost providers and a reduction in use of diagnostic and testing services) and improved performance on most performance metrics [8, 9] . Importantly, none of the performance metrics in the initial AQC 5-year contracting period or in more recent contracts have been specific to SUD treatment. In addition, financial risk for behavioral health service use was included (i.e. payment for behavioral health services was included in the global payment) in only a subset of contracts with AQC organizations (five of 12) established in the initial 3 years of the AQC .
The effects of accountable care and global payment models such as the AQC on care for individuals with SUD are unknown. Better integration of SUD and general medical service delivery and financing under the AQC model of global payment and accountable care could improve SUD treatment rates and quality of care [10] [11] [12] . As AQC organizations face a global budget for all services received by the patients they serve, AQC organizations have an incentive to improve the integration and efficiency of care to try to prevent high health-care expenditures by their patients, including those with chronic SUD and co-occurring medical and mental health conditions. The AQC's 5-year contracts (in contrast to the more typical 12-month contracts between provider organizations and health plans in the United States) provide incentives to identify and treat SUD using high-value, cost-effective interventions. Under the AQC, primary care physicians (PCPs) are given greater flexibility to coordinate the care received by their patients, with an eye towards reducing the burden of disease over the longer term given the 5-year contracts. Conversely, organizations at risk for a population's total health-care spending could avoid enrolling or restrict services for individuals seeking treatment for SUDs as this group tends to have higher total health-care expenditures than other individuals [13] .
Both public (the Medicaid and Medicare programs, government programs that provides insurance to lowerincome individuals and elderly and disabled individuals, respectively) and other private insurance plans in the United States are currently considering or have recently implemented models that are similar to the AQC. It is critical to assess the early experience of the AQC in order to understand the potential impact of these new models on care for individuals with SUD. This study tested hypotheses regarding whether the AQC affected: (1) use of SUD services among enrollees, (2) health-care spending (overall and SUD-specific) and (3) three SUD-specific performance metrics for enrollees in AQC organizations [14] , compared to enrollees in organizations that did not participate in the AQC, during the first 3 years of the AQC model's implementation . We also tested whether the effects varied across enrollees in AQC organizations that faced risk for behavioral health spending and enrollees in AQC organizations that did not face behavioral health risk.
METHODS

Data
This study uses 6 years of BCBSMA in-patient, out-patient and pharmacy claims data . The population includes all individuals aged 13-64 years who were enrolled continuously in a BCBSMA health maintenance organization (HMO) or point-of-service (POS) plan for at least 1 calendar year during the study period. This corresponded to 1 333 534 enrollees and 42 801 SUD service users. HMO and POS health plan types involve care that is typically managed more stringently by the commercial insurance company than other types of health plan products. Within the HMO and POS framework, primary care for the enrollees was provided in Massachusetts, but the enrollees could have lived outside Massachusetts. All BCBSMA HMO and POS plan enrollees are required to select a PCP upon enrollment. Participation in the AQC was determined by whether an enrollee's PCP belongs to an organization that has entered an AQC contract; seven organizations entered in 2009, four in 2010 and one in 2011. The comparison group for analyses thus includes both individuals in organizations that never entered the AQC and enrollees in organizations that later adopted the AQC. The unit of observation was the person-year. We included only those person-years with 12 months of enrollment in medical, behavioral and pharmacy benefits managed by BCBSMA.
Study design
The study uses a comparative interrupted time-series design, also known as a difference-in-differences (DD) design, to estimate the effects of the AQC, which tests whether the trends in the outcomes of interest change before and after organizations enter the AQC, and in particular whether the temporal changes in trends differ between organizations that did and did not actually enter the AQC. This design is used commonly in policy evaluations [8, 9, [15] [16] [17] , and is valid under an assumption that the differences in trends between AQC and non-AQC organizations in the pre-AQC time-period would have continued in the same way had the AQC never been initiated. Propensity score weights were used to ensure that the AQC and non-AQC groups were similar to each other on observed covariates in each year.
Identifying SUD service use
We employed a common approach to identifying SUD service users in insurance claims [18, 19] . SUD diagnoses were identified using the International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-9-CM) codes, in particular 291-292, 303-305.0 and 305.2-305.9. In-patient care was coded as SUD-related if the last primary diagnosis and the majority of all primary diagnoses in the in-patient admission were SUD diagnoses (as in [18] ). Out-patient visits were classified as SUD if there was a SUD primary or secondary diagnosis on the claim (as in [20] ); secondary diagnoses were included due to concerns that SUD has been undercoded systematically in out-patient claims. A person-year was considered a SUD service user if he or she had at least one SUD-related in-patient stay or out-patient visit during the calendar year. We considered a person-year with either of the following to have used a SUD medication: (1) pharmacy claim for naltrexone, disulfiram, acamprosate, methadone or buprenorphine; or (2) outpatient claim with a HCPCS/CPT code for administration of methadone or buprenorphine.
Outcome measures
We estimated the effect of the AQC on: (1) the probability of SUD service use; (2) average SUD spending and average total health-care spending among SUD service users; (3) the probability and quantity of specific types of SUD services used; and (4) Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS)-based performance measures. Among SUD service users, we examined the probability of using detoxification services, in-patient SUD services and SUD-specific medications. We did not model the probability of using out-patient SUD services because nearly all SUD service users received out-patient services. We examined the number of out-patient SUD visits among out-patient SUD users and the number of in-patient SUD days among in-patient SUD users. In the primary analyses detoxification services are included in the in-and out-patient counts, and in spending; a sensitivity analysis (results in the Supporting information, Appendix S3) examined the same outcomes but with claims for detoxification services excluded.
We also examined three HEDIS-based SUD performance measures (see Supporting information, Appendix S2 for details). HEDIS is a tool used by more than 90% of health plans in the United States to measure performance on important dimensions of care and service. In this case, we used three HEDIS measures-SUD identification, treatment initiation and treatment engagement-developed originally by the Washington Circle to capture how well health plans were performing with regard to SUD treatment [21] . We defined identification as the share of all enrollees who had a new SUD claim within a calendar year. We defined treatment initiation as the share of enrollees with a new episode of SUD treatment who initiated treatment within 14 days of their initial diagnosis. We defined treatment engagement as the share of enrollees with a new episode of SUD treatment who received at least two SUD services within 30 days of initial diagnosis.
Statistical analyses
For each outcome we examined two primary models within the difference-in-differences design. The first model estimates the overall effect of the AQC by fitting a model of the outcome as a function of AQC status (which is the primary predictor of interest) and a set of control variables. The second model estimates effects separately among enrollees in organizations that faced risk for behavioral health and those that did not (both relative to enrollees in organizations that did not participate in the AQC), by replacing the AQC indicator by a three-level variable to identify organizations as non-AQC, AQC with behavioral health risk or AQC without behavioral health risk. In supplementary analyses we also examined whether the effects varied by how long the organizations had participated in the AQC by including entry year by AQC interaction terms. All models controlled for gender; age categories (13-17, 18-27, 28-37, 38-47, 48-57, 58-64); the interaction of age and gender; risk score; whether the enrollee's provider organization entered the AQC in 2009, 2010 or 2011; and calendar year. The risk score was calculated by BCBSMA from current-year diagnoses (including comorbid mental health conditions), claims and demographic information and is based on the diagnostic-cost-group (D × CG) scoring system (Verisk Health, Waltham, MA, USA) [22] . Given that the outcomes of patients being seen in the same physician practices may be correlated, the standard errors accounted for clustering at the practice level by using Taylor series variance estimation, implemented using the svy commands in Stata 13.1 [23] . The resulting estimates can be interpreted as the average annual outcome if all enrollees were subject to the AQC versus if all enrollees were not subject to the AQC during the study period.
To adjust for potential differences in enrollee characteristics across the intervention and comparison groups, we used propensity score weighting [24] . These 'inverse probability of treatment weights' weight each of the groups (comparison enrollees, enrollees in AQC organizations with behavioral health risk, enrollees in AQC organizations without behavioral health risk) up to the combined sample of all three groups, thus making each of them comparable with each other. The propensity score model included age group, gender and the risk score. Note that these variables were also included as predictors in the outcome regression models; a large body of research has shown the benefits of including covariates in both the propensity score and outcome models [25] [26] [27] [28] . The weights are constructed separately for each calendar year (2009-11); in the pre-AQC period (2006-08) all weights are 1. It could be problematic to adjust for variables that are affected by the AQC (in the post-AQC years of 2009-11); however, it is unlikely that the case mix of enrollees served by providers with respect to these characteristics would change as a result of the AQC, and it is important to adjust for them to remove confounding of the effects from any differences in case-mix across the groups.
Two-part models were used to examine changes in the probability of any SUD service use and the amount of spending, conditional on SUD treatment, attributable to the AQC. The model's first stage used a logistic model, while the second stage used a linear model (as in [29] ). The probability of receiving specific types of services and the share of enrollees meeting HEDIS-based performance metrics were modeled using logistic regression. The quantity of specific types of services used was modeled using negative binomial models.
Model diagnostics were used to determine the primary analysis models; however, we also conducted sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our findings, including modeling spending using a log-gamma model and a logtransformed model. For the quantity measures, we conducted sensitivity analyses using Poisson models instead of negative binomial models. Finally, we estimated models without propensity score weights. All analyses were run in Stata version 13.1 [30] .
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics of SUD treatment users at the person-year level are provided in Table 1 . SUD service use among BCBSMA enrollees was low, with 1.5% of the comparison group and 1.8% of the AQC group using any SUD services in a calendar year. Nearly two-thirds of SUD users in a given year also received services for a mental health condition in that year. The two most common SUD diagnoses were alcohol and opioid use disorders.
The results from the difference-in-differences models estimating the effects of the AQC on the probability of using SUD services, and SUD and total health-care spending among SUD service users are shown in Table 2 and Fig. 1 . Estimates indicate that the AQC had no overall effect on the probability of using SUD services, average spending on SUD services or average total health-care spending among SUD service users. We detected a slight increase in the probability of SUD service use among enrollees in AQC organizations that did not face risk for behavioral health relative to the comparison group. Table 3 examines the effect of the AQC on the probability of using specific types of SUD services and, among those using services, the quantity of specific services used. The AQC had no effect on the probability of receiving detoxification services, SUD-related in-patient use or SUD medication use among SUD service users (except a potential decrease in SUD medication use among enrollees in organizations that did not face behavioral health risk and a marginally significant increase in the number of in-patient days). The AQC had no effect on the amount of detox received, the number of out-patient SUD services among users or on in-patient use. Table 4 indicates no overall effects of the AQC on HEDIS-based SUD performance measures. Enrollees in AQC organizations that did not face behavioral health risk had slightly higher rates of identification (consistent with results on SUD service use in Table 2 ), but lower rates of treatment initiation than enrollees in non-AQC organizations attributable to being in the AQC. We found no effect of the AQC on treatment engagement.
Results from the sensitivity analyses (Supporting information, Appendix S3) were qualitatively similar across all analyses, including analyses that excluded all claims for detoxification and unweighted analyses, with the exception that unweighted analyses indicated a slight increase in the number of in-patient days due to the AQC (9.89 versus 8.49 days; P = 0.01), both overall and for both the risk group (9.99 versus 8.49 days; P = 0.01) and the no-risk group (9.80 versus 8.49 days; P = 0.03), and a decrease in the number of out-patient visits among enrollees in AQC groups that did not face behavioral health risk (7.94 versus 8.44; P = 0.01). There was generally no evidence of effects varying by year of implementation.
DISCUSSION
Despite growing interest in global payment and accountable care models among both public and private payers in the United States and their potential for improving care for SUDs, we found almost no evidence that the AQC affected SUD performance metrics or spending on enrollees with SUD treatment in the first 3 years of the contract. We documented a slight increase in the probability of receiving any SUD services among enrollees in AQC organizations that did not face risk for behavioral health-care use (and a parallel effect in the HEDIS-based SUD treatment identification measure). While previous research has documented slower growth in total health-care spending among the full population of AQC enrollees [8, 9, 29] , there was no change in total health-care spending or SUD treatment-specific spending among SUD service users. Those overall savings for the full population were driven in large part by referrals to lower-cost providers in the early years and reductions in volume of procedures, imaging and tests in later years [9, 29] , which may be harder to achieve in the SUD context given the shortage of substance use treatment providers and general challenges to care coordination and adherence for patients who suffer from SUDs. It is notable that fewer than 2% of this sample used any SUD services in a calendar year. Given the long-standing under-diagnosis and undertreatment of patients with SUDs [20] , a reduction in the growth of SUD spending may be a less important aim for the provider organizations compared with the goal of improving access to evidence-based treatments. Limited focus on improving integration and quality of SUD treatment during the early years of the AQC is consistent with results from recent surveys of accountable care organizations [31] and of substance abuse treatment Models fitted using two-part models with linear models for spending. Models were propensity-score weighted and adjusted for gender, age category, risk score, year and AQC cohort. Dollar values adjusted for inflation. Difference-in-differences estimation used to account for secular trends *P < 0.05. CI = confidence interval. Figure 1 Effects of the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) on the probability of substance use disorder (SUD) service use and on SUD spending among SUD service users (SAT) organizations [32] in the United States. Only 14% of accountable care organizations surveyed reported that integration of behavioral health and primary care was nearly or fully complete [31] , while only 15% of SAT organizations had signed agreements to be part of an ACO [32] . It is also consistent with knowledge about the implementation of the AQC program itself; AQC organization leaders reported little focus on this area during the AQC's first 3 years as they struggled to reorient their systems in response to the AQC. Similarly, leaders of specialty behavioral health provider organizations in Massachusetts have indicated a low level of awareness of the AQC, and no substantial changes in referral patterns or contracting practices due to the AQC [33] . Probability of use models fit using logistic regression. Visit quantity models fitted using negative binomial models. All models propensity score weighted and adjusted for gender, age category, risk score, year and AQC cohort. Difference-in-differences estimation used to account for secular trends. *P < 0.05. CI = confidence interval. Logistic regression models propensity-score weighted and adjusted for gender, age category, risk score, year and AQC cohort. Difference-in-differences estimation used to account for secular trends. Identification refers to the share of all enrollees who had a new SUD claim within a calendar year. Treatment initiation refers to the share of enrollees with a new episode of SUD treatment who initiated treatment within 14 days of their initial diagnosis. Treatment engagement refers to the share of enrollees with a new episode of SUD treatment who received at least two SUD services within 30 days of their initial diagnosis. Appendix S2 for details *P < 0.05. CI = confidence interval.
In recent years (after our study period) several AQC organizations have initiated efforts to improve the integration of behavioral health and other services, including using behavioral health case managers or social workers on clinical teams that work to integrate care for behavioral health and other chronic conditions for complex patients [33] . In addition, in 2012, BCBSMA took a leadership role nationally in addressing the opioid epidemic plaguing the United States by changing its policies governing coverage for prescription opioid medications. Future work should investigate the effects of these more recent initiatives on SUD treatment, to examine if more focused attention and efforts led to effects on such care [34, 35] .
There are probably still barriers, however, to efforts to improve SUD coordination and quality. First, the US 42 Code of Federal Regulations (or 42 CFR) restricting the disclosure and use of patient SUD records represents a major barrier to SUD integration efforts, making it difficult for health-care providers to share information (such as on current or past alcohol or drug use problems or SUD service use) with providers or coordinate the services received by patients.
Secondly, the lack of SUD performance measures in the AQC contracts, and in the field more generally, may have also served as a barrier to efforts to improve SUD quality and coordination, as AQC organizations probably focused upon those areas of care that are measured and incented under the contract. Global payment models rely upon financial incentives for meeting performance measures to protect against under-provision or stinting on care. While the lack of meaningful, validated quality measures for mental health treatment has generally been noted as a problem for improving quality of mental health services [36] , the lack of good SUD measures is perhaps even more striking. As risk-based payment models expand, a broader set of SUD measures is needed to ensure high-quality SUD care. However, while such measures may help to enhance integration and quality, provider organizations may be challenged in implementing the measures while balancing privacy needs of patients and the federal privacy protections of the 42 CFR.
Finally, many locations in the United States , including Massachusetts, have a shortage of substance abuse treatment providers with strong linkages with large provider groups; this, too, limits the ability of models such as the AQC to improve care quality and coordination.
Several limitations should be noted. First, this analysis is focused upon a global payment and accountable care model implemented by a single private insurer in the United States; thus, results may not be generalizable to other reforms implemented by either public or private payers. Secondly, while AQC organizations with contracts that included behavioral health risk and those that did not include it did not appear to differ systematically in obvious ways (e.g. size, level of integration), it is possible that there are unobservable differences. However, we did not observe differences in pre-intervention trends in outcomes between each AQC cohort and the comparison group. In addition, the analysis adjusts for any differences in trends during the pre-AQC period, using an assumption that they would have persisted over time. Thirdly, we focus our analyses on the first 3 years of AQC implementation, so we are unable to examine the long-term impacts of this change. As of 2011, approximately 44% of BCBSMA HMO and POS enrollees were part of the AQC; we viewed this as a tipping-point in terms of having a viable BCBSMA comparison group. However, this means we are not able to determine whether adoption of the AQC led to changes affecting individuals with SUD in the years following the end of our study period. It is not uncommon for changes in outcomes to occur years after policy adoption, given inherent challenges associated with altering well-established provider practice patterns. Finally, claims data, which provide comprehensive information on service use and spending, are limited in their ability to capture clinical detail that may be relevant for understanding quality of care. Nevertheless, this study provides the first information about the impact on SUD treatment of risk-based payment models that are being considered and implemented increasingly by both public and private payers in the United States as an effort to improve the efficiency and quality of service delivery.
Despite concerns about under-provision of SUD services under global payment, this study found that SUD service use and spending did not decline as a result of the AQC. However, it is also clear that the AQC did not spur major improvements in care for SUD during the contract's initial years. As AQC organizations begin to put into place initiatives to improve behavioral health integration, it will be critical to continue to track whether these changes translate into meaningful change in service use, health-care spending or care quality for people with SUD treatment needs.
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